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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
THE STATE OF UTAH

VIRGINIA M. Corbitt,
Petitioner,

i

v.
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE
FINANCING,

]
i
)
]
]

Case No. 890674-CA
Category No. 14a

Respondent.
BRIEF OF PETITIONER

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
This is a petition for review of a formal adjudicative
proceeding.

Jurisdiction to hear this petition is vested in the

Court of Appeals by Utah Code Ann. §S

63-46b-16, 78-2a-3(2) (a) .

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Virginia M. Corbitt seeks review of a final decision of the
Director of the Utah Department of Health (DOH), Division of Health
Care Financing (DHCF), which affirmed in part and reversed in part
a hearing officer's decision.

The hearing officer found that

Corbitt's first application for Medicaid was properly denied for
failure to provide necessary verification of eligibility.

The

Director affirmed this holding. The hearing officer further found
petitioner eligible for Medicaid on a second application, holding
that a transfer on February 23, 1989
1

of certain assets was not

done

in

Medicaid.

contemplation

of

an

application

for

benefits

under

The hearing officer's order was reviewed by the Director

of DHCF wh< i a f f i rmed t; he hear i ity of f i eei: as f o t. he 1 i rs L ruling,
but reversed the second ruling, finding that the transfer of assets
violated

the

agency's

policies

and

procedures,

thereby

making

petitioner ineligible for Medicaid *
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Whether the Director of DHCF erroneously interpreted or

applied the 1 .aw I n fi riding tha t petitioner's fi rst application was
properly denied for a lack of verification?
2.

Whether the Director of DHCF erroneously interpreted or

applied the law i ,:n fi nding that the transfer of certain assets on
February

23,

1989

was

done

in order

to

qualify

for

Medicaid,

thereby disqualifying petitioner from receiving benefits?

3. Whether the Director of DHCF was illegally constituted as
a decision-making body or was subject to disqualification because
of his interest in the financial matters of the Utah Medicaid
program?
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES,
ORDINANCES AND RULES
42 U.S.C. § 1396a et seq.
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(2)(c)(2)
(1988)

42 C.F.R. S 435.911
Utah-DSS Vol. H I M § 565-2
2.B. (7-89)
Utah-DSS V o l . H I M § 5 6 5 - 3
2.

(11-89)

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The

Utah

Administrative

Procedures

Act

provides

that

an

appellate court may grant relief if it determines that a person
2

seeking review has been substantially prejudiced by the agency's
erroneous interpretation or application of the law. Utah Code Ann.
S 63-46b-16(4)(d) (1988).

The Supreme Court has held that the

correction-of-error standard applies to agency rulings on issues
of law and extends no deference to them.
Comm'n., 767 P.2d

524, 527

Hurley v. Industrial

(Utah 1988).

Concerning

issues

involving mixed law and fact, an agency decision deserves some
deference and will not be set aside unless it is unreasonable. Id.
However, the deference given an agency in its area of expertise is
not so expansive as to require a sanctioning of the agency's
misinterpretation of its own statute and related rules.

Boyd v.

Dep't. of Empl. Sec., 773 P.2d 398, 400 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
a.

Nature of the case
This is a request for review by the Court of Appeals of a

final agency decision denying Virginia Corbitt Medicaid benefits.
Corbitt requested a hearing, following denial of benefits on two
applications for Medicaid benefits. The hearing officer found that
Corbitt's initial application had been properly denied, since she
had not supplied the necessary verification.

He found that the

denial of Corbitt's second application was improper, since property
transferred by her prior to filing for Medicaid was done for
purposes other than to qualify for Medicaid. The Director of DHCF
reviewed the hearing officer's decision and affirmed the denial of
the first application but reversed the second finding.
seeks reversal of the Director's

Corbitt

decision and a declaration that

3

she has been eligible for Medicaid since the date of her original
application.
b.

Course of Proceedings
Corbitt filed her first application for benefits on March 16,

1989.

(Transcript of Hearing ("TH") 24)

It was denied May 11#

1989 for the reason that the necessary verification to determine
eligibility was not provided. (Clerk's Notation of Record ("NR")
53) Corbitt requested a hearing which was held September 12, 1989
before Hearing Officer Cornelius Hyzer. (TH 2) The day prior to
the hearing, Corbitt had filed a second application for Medicaid
which was denied September 12, 1989 for the reason given that
Corbitt had transferred her share in property held jointly with
her son, Whitney Corbitt, on February 23, 1989 at less than fair
market value and for the purpose of qualifying for Medicaid. (NR
56) On September 20, 1989, the hearing officer affirmed the first
denial but reversed the second, finding that Corbitt had not
transferred property in order to qualify for Medicaid. (NR 28) The
Director of the Medicaid agency reviewed the formal order and, in
an order on review issued October 20, 1989, affirmed the first
finding, but reversed the second. (NR 21)

Corbitt filed her

petition for writ of review on November 20, 1989. (NR 9)
c.

Disposition at the Medicaid Agency
The final agency action denied Corbitt Medicaid on both of her

applications. The final result of the agency's action is that she
will remain ineligible for Medicaid up to 30 months from the date
of transfer. (TH 51-52)
4

d.

Relevant Facts
Virginia Corbitt is an eighty-one-year-old woman who until

June 1986 resided with her son, Whitney Corbitt, at a home owned
jointly with him. (TH 48).

At that time, Corbitt left the family

home and moved to a retirement center. (TH 48)

On September 12,

1986, she deeded one-half of the home to her son by a quit claim
deed. (NR 47)

Corbitt remained in the retirement home until

February 13, 1989 when she fell and was taken to St. Mark's
Hospital. (TH 46-47)

She remained in the hospital until February

23, 1989 when she was transferred to Care West Nursing Home in Salt
Lake City.

(TH 46)

Prior to leaving the hospital, Corbitt signed a quit claim
deed conveying the other half interest in the home to her son,
Whitney Corbitt. (TH 46, NR 51)

She also signed a durable power

of attorney, appointing her son, Whitney Corbitt, as her attorney
in fact. (NR 49)
At the time Corbitt was placed at Care West Nursing Home, she
was receiving Medicare benefits which paid for her hospitalization
and initial nursing home stay. (NR 73)

On March 16, 1989,

following expiration of her Medicare eligibility, Corbitt's son
applied for Medicaid benefits on behalf of his mother. (TH 24)
Whitney Corbitt obtained the Medicaid application from Christine
DeBlasio,

a

social

worker

at

Care

West.

(TH

4)

Certain

verification was needed for approval of the application, which
Whitney Corbitt attempted to obtain. (TH 18-20)

The requested

verification was not supplied and the application was denied on May
5

11, 1989. (NR 53)

A hearing was requested and held on September

12, 1989 before Hearing Officer Cornelius Hyzer. (TH 2)

The day

before the hearing, Whitney Corbitt submitted a second application
for Medicaid which was denied September 12, 1989. (NR 56)

The

reason given for the denial was that the applicant had transferred
a share of her home in February 1989 without receiving fair market
value and for the purpose of qualifying for Medicaid. (NR 56)
Corbitt was advised that the sanction period for the denial would
be the lesser of thirty months or the fair market value of the
property transferred divided by $1,530.00. (NR 56)
At the hearing, Whitney Corbitt appeared and testified that
the verification required to complete the first application was
delayed, because he had had difficulty obtaining documentation from
his attorney. (TH 31) He testified that Virginia Corbitt conveyed
the half interest in the home to him on February 23, 1989 on the
advice of his attorney. (TH 44) He testified his mother was in the
hospital at the time and that the transfer needed to be done, but
was not done to hide assets in order to qualify for Medicaid. (TH
44) The transfer was done, according to Whitney Corbitt, to avoid
the possibility of his mother becoming incapable of signing over
the title to him. (TH 44)

He testified that the previous half

interest was transferred to him in 1986 on the advice of his
attorney

in order to protect the property during a divorce

proceeding. (TH 44)

He testified that in February 1989, the

divorce was final and it seemed to be a good time in which to

6

transfer the other half, since his ex-wife no longer had a claim.
(TH 45, 56)
The social worker, Christine DeBlasio, testified that at the
time Virginia Corbitt was admitted to the nursing home, it was not
expected that she would remain there for a long period of time. (TH
8)

She noted that petitioner's treating physician, Dr. John B.

Stanchfield, had stated that to his knowledge Virginia Corbitt
would be able to return to her home after a short stay at the
nursing home. (NR 32, TH 9-10)

DeBlasio testified that because of

Virginia Corbitt's declining medical condition, including a series
of small strokes, it was determined in mid-March that she would not
be able to return home and that an application for Medicaid should
be initiated. (TH 61-62)
A representative of the Medicaid agency who appeared at the
hearing, testified that Corbitt's second application was denied on
the basis of state policy contained in Vol. Ill § 565-2.

The

representative testified that it is the Medicaid agency's policy
to sanction a client who transfers property on the same day as
entering a nursing home. (TH 51)

The agency representative

testified in part:
[B]ecause of the situation, because of the
medical condition at the point of the transfer
with her medical condition being that way and
entry into the nursing home on that same day,
we were basically saying that it was a
transfer to become eligible for Medicaid, so
we would apply the sanctions that I have just
indicated there. (TH 54)

7

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Federal Medicaid regulations controlling Corbitt's case do not
mandate a denial of Medicaid benefits, when verification is not
completed within a 45-day period.

A Medicaid agency is permitted

to keep the file open indefinitely, pending completion of the
application by the claimant.

In this case, the Director erred in

finding that Corbitt's initial application was properly denied.
The Federal statutes and regulations provide that a Medicaid
applicant who seeks benefits for nursing home care may be denied
eligibility for a transfer of assets, unless a satisfactory showing
is made that the transfer was for purposes other than to qualify
for Medicaid.

In this case, the hearing officer correctly found

that the transfer of assets was proper.

The Director of DHCF, in

reviewing the hearing officer's decision, applied an erroneous
standard by concluding that an inference of ineligibility may be
drawn when an applicant enters a nursing home on the same day she
transfers property. The Director articulated no legitimate reasons
for reversing the favorable decision.

But for the improper state

policy, the Director should have affirmed the hearing officer's
decision finding Virginia Corbitt eligible for Medicaid.
The Director was not an impartial person for purposes of
reviewing the hearing officer's decision.

He had an interest in

the financial affairs of the Medicaid program.
have been disqualified from reviewing the case.

8

Thus, he should

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DIRECTOR'S DECISION UPHOLDING THE DENIAL OF CORBITT'S
FIRST APPLICATION FOR FAILURE TO PROVIDE VERIFICATION
SHOULD BE REVERSED, SINCE IT IS BASED ON AN ERRONEOUS
INTERPRETATION OR APPLICATION OF THE MEDICAID LAW.
The hearing officer held, and the Director of DHCF affirmed,
that Corbitt was not entitled to Medicaid eligibility on the basis
of her March 16, 1989 application, for the stated reason that she
had not provided verification as required by state policy and
procedure.

Corbitt's son, Whitney Corbitt, applied for benefits

on March 16, 1989 on behalf of his mother and was advised to
provide certain verification by March 28, 1989. Her son was unable
to obtain the necessary documentation until the time of the hearing
on September 12, 1989. Certain bank records were provided to the
hearing officer within five days of the hearing as requested. (NR
13-20) However, the hearing officer held the denial of the first
application to be proper, because Corbitt's son failed to provide
the requested verification within the time limit set by the
caseworker. The caseworker testified that there was "a time period
of 45 days" in which to make a decision on Corbitt's application.
(TH 25) Caseworker Anita Peterson also testified that 45 days was
the limit for processing an application: "There's 45 days or we
have to deny." (TH 28)
The hearing officer noted that the 45 day time limit for
providing verification may be extended by the agency, but concluded
it was unreasonable to expect the application to be held open
indefinitely pending verification. (NR 29)
9

A review of the

Medicaid statute and regulation shows that a Medicaid agency is
not required to deny Medicaid when verification is not provided
within the 45-day time limit. The Director has failed to identify
a sufficient legal basis for concluding that the March 16, 1989
application was properly denied.
Medicaid is a complicated federal/state health program which
has been described as "among the most intricate ever drafted by
Congress."

Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 43, 69 L.Ed.

2d 460, 101 S. Ct.2633 (1981).

Since Medicaid is a joint health

care effort between the federal government and participating state
governments,

legal

determinations

necessarily

involve

a

consideration of both state and federal law, with federal law
controlling under the Supremacy Clause of the federal Constitution.
This interrelationship has been well summarized in the case of
Buc kner

v.

Maher,

424

F.Supp.

366,

369

(D.

Conn.

1976).

Implementation of a Medicaid program is authorized in the state of
Utah by Utah Code Ann. S 26-18-2.1 (1988).
Neither the relevant federal statute nor the implementing
regulation prescribes a strict time limit for determining Medicaid
eligibility. The relevant portions of the federal Medicaid statute
provide as follows:
A state plan for medical assistance must —
....

(8) provide that all individuals wishing to
make application for medical assistance under
the plan shall have opportunity to do so, and
that such assistance shall be furnished with
reasonable
promptness
to
all
eligible
individuals;
10

(19)
provide such safeguards as may be
necessary to assure that eligibility for care
and
services
under
the
plan
will
be
determined, and such care and services will be
provided,
in
a manner
consistent
with
simplicity of administration and the best
interests of the recipients;

(34)
provide that in the case of any
individual who has been determined to be
eligible for medical assistance under the
plan, such assistance will be made available
to him for care and services included under
the plan and furnished in or after the third
month before the month in which he made
application (or application was made on his
behalf in the case of a deceased individual)
for such assistance if such individual was (or
upon application would have been) eligible for
such assistance at the time such care and
services were furnished;

42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8),(19),(34)
• The

relevant

federal

regulation

governing

timely

determinations of eligibility is found at 42 C.F.R. § 435.911 and
provides as follows:
(a) The agency must establish time standards
for determining eligibility and inform the
applicant of what they are. These standards
may not exceed —
(1) Sixty days for applicants who apply for
Medicaid on the basis of disability; and
(2)
Forty-five
days
for
all
other
applicants.
(b)
The time standards must cover the
period from the date of application to the
date the agency mails notice of its decision
to the applicant.
(c) The agency must determine eligibility
within the standards except
in unusual

11

circumstances, for example —
(1) When the agency cannot reach a decision
because
the
applicant
or
an
examining
physician delays or fails to take a required
action, or
(2)
Where there is an administrative or
other emergency beyond the agency's control.
(d) The agency must document the reasons
for delay in the applicant's case record.
(e)
The agency must not use the time
standards —
(1) As a waiting period before determining
eligibility; or
(2)
As a reason for denying eligibility
(because it has not determined eligibility
within the time standards).
The

state policy

and procedure manual which

applies

the

federal laws provides:
Eligibility Decisions
1.

Deadline for Determining Eligibility

A. An eligibility decision must be made within 45 days
of the date of the application. There is one exception:
a decision must be made within 90 days of the date of the
application if a disability determination must be made
as part of the eligibility determination.
If a decision cannot be made before the deadline,
document the cause of the delay in the case record.
Utah-DSS Vol. IIIM § 703-5 l.A.
Verification
What Must Be Verified?
All factors of eligibility must be verified.
There is only one exception to this rule. It is called
"The Prudent Person Concept". This assumes that, as a
prudent person, you can use your professional judgment
to decide if something can be left unverified. If you
decide to accept the client's word for something instead
of verifying it, document it in the case record or
application form. Utah-DSS Vol. IIIM S 731-1.

12

Who Must Provide Verification?
It is the responsibility of the applicant or recipient
to obtain acceptable verification of eligibility factors.
Help the client to get the verification if the client
needs help. Utah-DSS Vol. IIIM § 731-2. See Addendum
The federal law and regulations do not mandate denial of a
Medicaid

application

when

the

applicant

does

not

complete

verification within a forty-five day period. Instead, the law sets
out

a general

exceptions.

requirement

of

forty-five

days, with

certain

One of the exceptions contained in the federal

regulation is when the applicant delays in taking a required
action. In this case, the providing of additional verification was
a required action which was delayed by causes beyond Corbitt's
control. She relied on her son, Whitney Corbitt, to accomplish her
Medicaid eligibility.

He testified that because of his inability

to obtain documents from his lawyer, it was not possible to
complete the application within the stated time period. (TH 31)
This should have been considered by the hearing officer as an
extenuating circumstance which, under the federal regulation, would
permit the application file to be kept open beyond the forty-five
day time limit.

The Medicaid agency caseworker should not have

closed Corbitt's file, but should have simply noted in the file the
reason for the delay. Instead, the caseworker applied an improper
state policy which directed denial at the end of 45 days.
A

state

Medicaid

contradicts federal law.

agency

cannot

adopt

a

policy

which

It is well established in the case law

that a state regulation is invalid if found to be inconsistent with
13

the federal statute governing the program. Townsend v. Swank, 404
U.S. 282, 286, 92 S. Ct. 502, 30 L.Ed. 2d 448 (1971); King v.
Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 333, 88 S. Ct. 2128, 20 L.Ed. 2d 1118 (1968).
While a state's participation in Medicaid is voluntary, once it
elects to participate in the program, it must fully comply with
federal statutes and regulations.
175

(7th Cir. 1981).

Smith v. Miller, 665 F.2d 172,

A participating state does have some

discretion in establishing time limits for filing claims, but such
limits have been construed as directory in nature, from which
exception should be granted to avoid an injustice when the facts
so demand. Matter of King James Nursing Home, 351 A.2d 363, 367
(1976).
When the facts in the case are considered in light of the
above-referenced law, it should be concluded that Corbitt was
improperly denied Medicaid eligibility on her first application.
The hearing officer did not consider the express language of the
federal regulation which permits additional time for determining
eligibility when delays are caused by the applicant.

Since the

federal law does not require a denial of an application under these
circumstances, any explicit or implicit requirements in the state
regulations requiring denial are inconsistent and invalid under the
Supremacy

Clause.

The

federal

regulation

clearly

reflects

congressional intent to permit exceptions to a harsh time limit
when equity and justice so require.

The facts of this case

demonstrate a solid basis for such an exception.
incapable of completing her own Medicaid application.
14

Corbitt was
She relied

on the assistance of her son who made a good faith effort to comply
with the caseworker's requirements. Since the federal law does not
strictly require compliance with a forty-five-day time limit, the
hearing officer should have granted more latitude and considered
the date of the first application as the effective date of
eligibility.
POINT II
THE DECISION SHOULD BE REVERSED, SINCE THE
DIRECTOR ERRED IN APPLYING THE LAW IN FINDING
THAT CORBITT TRANSFERRED ASSETS IN ORDER TO
QUALIFY FOR MEDICAID.
The Medicaid statute has for some time allowed states to
impose a penalty on persons who transfer assets in order to qualify
for Medicaid to cover nursing home expenses. Until recently, the
sanctioning of persons who made such transfers was optional.

42

U.S.C. S 1396p(c)(1983). The statute provided that states could
deny assistance when a transfer was made within 24 months of
application, provided they specified a procedure implementing such
denial which was no more restrictive than that set forth in 42
U.S.C. § 1382b(c)(1983). The referenced section was contained in
that portion of the Social Security Act governing the Supplemental
Security Income (SSI) program and contained a similar penalty for
transfers during a 24-month period.

Additionally, the statute

created a presumption that such transfers were made to establish
eligibility

for

assistance

"convincing

evidence

to

unless

establish

the
that

applicant
the

furnished

transaction

was

exclusively for some other purpose." 42 U.S.C. § 1382b(c)(2)(1983)
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On July 1, 1988, the statutes referenced above were amended.
The Medicaid statute was amended to require states to sanction
individuals who transferred property for less than fair market
value during a 30-month period prior to applying for Medicaid. 42
U.S.C. S 1396p(c)(1)(1988)

Deleted from the Medicaid statute was

the previous cross-reference to the SSI statute in 42 U.S.C. §
1382b(c).

Instead, the Medicaid statute was revised to provide

that an individual need only make a "satisfactory showing" that the
transfer was made for a purpose other than to qualify for Medicaid.
Specifically/ the statute now reads:
(2) An individual shall not be ineligible for
medical assistance by reason of paragraph (1)_
to the extent that —

(C) a satisfactory showing is made to the
State (in accordance with any regulations
promulgated by the Secretary) that (i) the
individual intended to dispose of the
resources either at fair market value, or for
other valuable consideration, or (ii) the
resources were transferred exclusively for a
purpose other than to qualify for medical
assistance. 42 U.S.C. S 1396p(c)(2)(C)(1988)
At the time of Corbitt's hearing, the hearing officer applied
state regulations which were not in strict compliance with the
federal statute.

Included in the record as Exhibit 4 is Section

565-2 of Vol. IIIM regarding transfers of assets on or after July
1#

1988. (NR 57)

The applicable portion of that regulation

provided as follows:
Do not sanction the client if the client can
prove the asset was not transferred in order
to become eligible for Medicaid. It is the
client's responsibility to provide evidence
16

that a transfer was made for another purpose
AND that Medicaid was not even a minor factor
in the decision. If a reliance upon Medicaid
can be inferred, sanction the client.
(emphasis added) Utah DSS-Vol. IIIM § 565-2
(7-89)1
Despite the state's use of a regulation which was more
restrictive than required by the Medicaid statute, the hearing
officer correctly found that Corbitt had established sufficient
evidence to overcome the presumption that she had transferred
property to her son in order to qualify for Medicaid. Although the
hearing officer did not use the "satisfactory showing" standard,
it is clear from his decision that he felt the resources in
question were transferred for a purpose other than to qualify for
Medicaid. Reviewing the hearing officer's decision in light of the
correct standard cited above, it should be concluded that his
decision was based on substantial evidence as articulated in his
decision. Because of its relevance, the hearing officer's summary
is quoted in extenso:

x

The pertinent section has since been revised to remove the
offensive final sentence. The most recent version of the IIIM
manual reads:
Do not sanction the client if the client can
prove the asset was not transferred in order
to become eligible for Medicaid. It is the
client's responsibility to provide evidence
that a transfer was made for another purpose
AND that Medicaid was not even a minor factor
in the decision.
Follow the guidelines in
Sec. 565-3. Utah-DSS Vol. IIIM § 565-2.B (290)
The guidelines referred to in section 565-3 are contained in
the Addendum.
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The Petitioner in this case was fully aware of
her desire to transfer her assets as an
inheritance to her son and had taken steps to
do so in 1986. Under advice of counsel, and
with a divorce pending, it was prudent to
delay the transfer of the remaining equity in
the property to him until the divorce was
concluded. The testimony of the Petitioner's
son was that there was no expectation
whatsoever that she would be requiring
Medicaid when she had other insurance
available and it was anticipated that this
would be short term stay.
It was the
intervening small strokes that caused the
petitioner to lose her mental faculties,
creating a pressing need to obtain Medicaid
benefits. This all took place subsequent to
the quit claim deed being signed on February
23, 1989. The law provides for a presumption
that the transfer of assets was done in
contemplation of application for Medicaid
benefits,
but
the
testimony
of
the
Petitioner's son rebuts the presumption and
therefore prevails.
The only evidence
presented at the hearing on this issue showed
that the Petitioner was anticipated to have a
short stay at the nursing home which would
preclude any expectation of a long term stay,
especially of the type of serious nature that
developed
in this Petitioner's medical
condition. (NR 28) See Addendum
When the hearing officer's decision reached the Director of
DHCF, an incorrect standard was applied in reviewing the findings.
The Director states in his decision:
In this case, the Division of Health Care
Financing finds that based upon the hearing
record, a reliance upon Medicaid can be
inferred....Reliance upon Medicaid can be
inferred when an eighty-one-year-old woman
such as petitioner enters a nursing home,
gives her son the power-of-attorney and quit
claims her dwelling to him on the same
day....However, a reasonable inference can be
drawn that reliance upon Medicaid was
contemplated....(emphasis added) (NR 23-24)
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The Director erred in not applying the proper standard for
judging whether a transfer of assets was made to qualify for
Medicaid. The statute clearly requires that an applicant need only
make a "satisfactory showing"; it says nothing about drawing an
inference from facts established at the hearing.

The hearing

officer had already found that the presumption of a disqualifying
transfer had been overcome. To allow the Director in reviewing the
decision to draw a different inference from the facts results in
the presumption being reconstituted and, in effect, makes it
irrebuttable.

Such a result is not condoned in the law.

See

People in Interest of S.P.B., 651 P.2d 1213, 1217 (Colo. 1982).
Reliance on an inference in a case of this type was rejected
in Harrison v. Comm'r, 529 A.2d 188 (Conn. 1987) wherein the
Connecticut Supreme Court reviewed a transfer of assets under the
old statute.

The Connecticut Medicaid agency had included a

"foreseeability test" in its manual and provided that if an
applicant

had

failed

to

retain

sufficient

assets

to

meet

foreseeable needs for 24 months after the transfer, "it must be
inferred" that the transfer was not made exclusively for some other
purpose than to qualify for Medicaid. The court began its analysis
by noting the fundamental rule that an administrative agency must
act within its statutory mandate and "has no authority to modify,
abridge or otherwise change the statutory provisions under which
it acquires authority." Id., at 192.
Connecticut

regulations

under

the
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old

The court reviewed the
"convincing

evidence"

standard of 42 U.S.C. § 1382b(c) and concluded that the department
policy was inconsistent with federal and state statutes.
An overly restrictive transfer of assets rule was also
reviewed and rejected in Randall v. Lukhard, 709 F.2d 257 (4th Cir.
1983)

The court held that a Virginia rule requiring documentary

evidence in every case showing that a claimant has other resources
available at the time of transfer to cover present and expected
future medical expenses was excessive.

The court found it highly

improbable that disabled individuals would be able to objectively
demonstrate availability of other assets to avoid disqualification.
The court stated:
We think that they should not be rendered
ineligible if by other credible evidence,
short of documentary proof, they can establish
that theirs was a lawful purpose. Id., at 267
In Downer v. State Dep't of Human Resources, 705 P.2d 144 (Nev.
1985), a ninety-year-old individual who transferred property to his
daughter and son-in-law prior to applying for Medicaid was held to
be not disqualified.

The court concluded that the Medicaid

applicant could not have anticipated an application for Medicaid,
because he believed his death was imminent.
Recent amendments to respondent's regulations further suggest
that the "inference" language is not permissible.

As noted, the

offending sentence has now been removed. See supra. at 17, n.l.
Second, a set of guidelines has been added for determining whether
a transfer was made in order to qualify for Medicaid.
Vol. IIIM § 565-3

(11-89).

Utah-DSS

Although the guidelines may be

questionable in light of Randall v. Lukhard, supra, they do contain
20

two criteria which lend support to petitioner's argument.

The

section provides in part:
Some Factors Indicating the Transfer Was Not
to Become Eligible
Here is a list of some factors which may
indicate the client did not transfer assets to
become eligible and did not expect Medicaid to
meet his needs after the transfer. This list
is not all-inclusive.
A.

The client suddenly, unexpectedly, became
disabled AFTER the transfer.

B. The client learned that he has a disabling
condition AFTER the transfer. Utah-DSS
Vol. IIIM § 565-3 2. (11-89)
In this case, the evidence established, and the hearing
officer found, that Corbitt's incapacitating condition arose after
she was admitted to the nursing home on February 23, 1989. Based
on respondent's own regulations, that finding is entitled to
substantial weight.

The hearing officer who reviewed Corbitt's

case, and who had the best opportunity to judge her credibility,
concluded that the transfer of property was not made for a
disqualifying purpose.

When his decision was reviewed by the

Director, an improper standard utilizing an inference was applied.
At the time of the review, the Medicaid statute did not contain any
language allowing the Director of DHCF to draw an inference from
facts established at a hearing. Instead, the Director was required
to determine whether a satisfactory showing had been made that the
transfer was for some purpose other than to qualify for Medicaid.
The Director articulated no legitimate reasons for reversing the
hearing officer's decision.

His reversal represents an arbitrary
21

act in complete disregard of the Medicaid statute.

Under the

principles of law governing the relationship between the state and
federal participants in the Medicaid program, it was improper for
the Director to apply such a standard. A review of the law and the
record shows that the hearing officer applied the correct legal
standard and identified substantial evidence upon which to base
his decision.

Therefore, the Director's decision should be

reversed and the hearing officer's holding reinstated, finding
Corbitt eligible for Medicaid.
POINT III
THE DIRECTOR'S DECISION SHOULD BE REVERSED
SINCE HE WAS SUBJECT TO DISQUALIFICATION
BECAUSE OF HIS FINANCIAL INTEREST IN
THE MEDICAID PROGRAM.
The statute establishing the Medicaid program also provides
that an opportunity for a fair hearing must be provided to
individuals denied medical assistance. 42 U.S.C. S 1396a(3) (1983).
The statute is implemented in the federal regulations at 42 C.F.R.
S 431.200 et seq..

The regulation provides that the state's

hearing system must provide for:
(1) a hearing before the agency; or
(2) an evidentiary hearing at the local level, with the
right of appeal to a state agency hearing.
42 C.F.R. S 431.205(1985)
The regulation then provides that if a local evidentiary hearing
decision is adverse to an applicant or recipient, the agency must
inform the individual of a right of appeal to the state agency.
42 C.F.R. S 431.232

The regulations require that a state plan
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provide the necessary means for meeting the hearing requirements
listed.
The state of Utah provides hearing rights in its regulations
for applicants and recipients. Utah Admin. Code § R455-14 et seq..
A hearing officer is to conduct a fair hearing, but is not
empowered to issue a final agency decision.

Instead, at the

conclusion of the formal hearing, the hearing officer is to submit
a recommended decision to the executive director of DOH who will
then decide whether to accept or reject it.

Judicial review is

then to be allowed from the executive director's decision.

See

Addendum.
The result of the review system established by the state of
Utah DOH is that every fair hearing decision is reviewed by the
Director of the Medicaid program who is also responsible for
conserving the limited resources of the Medicaid program.

Utah

provides by statute for creation of DHCF and for the appointment
of a Director by the DOH executive director. Utah Code Ann. § 2618-2.2.

Among the responsibilities of the director of DHCF is to

"prepare and administer the division's budget..." Id. The statute
further

provides

that

the division

"is responsible

for the

effective and impartial administration of this chapter in an
efficient, economical manner."

Utah Code Ann. § 26-18-2.3.

Finally, it provides:
The division shall establish, on a statewide
basis, a program to safeguard against
unnecessary or inappropriate use of Medicaid
services, excessive payments, and unnecessary
or inappropriate hospital admissions or
lengths of stay. Id.
23

It is well established in the law that an adjudicator of an
administrative claim is disqualified if he has a pecuniary interest
in the outcome. Myer v. Niles Township, 477 F.Supp. 357, 362 (N.D.
111. 1979). The adjudicator is disqualified even if the pecuniary
interest is no more than an indirect outgrowth of a desire to
protect official funds. Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S.
57, 93 S. Ct. 80, 34 L.Ed. 2d 267(1972) (A mayor responsible for
village finances and whose court generated village funds was
disqualified from trying traffic offenses.)

In Myer, the court

held that a panel of township supervisors who had the sole
discretion to determine an applicant's eligibility for medical
indigent benefits and who also had an interest in protecting
township funds could not provide a fair hearing before an unbiased
decision-maker.

Myer v. Niles Township, supra, at 362.

In this case, Director Betit has a direct, statutorilymandated obligation to protect and conserve scarce Medicaid funds.
Given Director Betit's pecuniary interest in protecting Medicaid
funds, he could not act as an impartial agency officer in reviewing
Corbitt's claim. Therefore, he should have been disqualified from
reviewing the hearing officer's decision.
CONCLUSION
The Director erred in finding that Corbitt's first application
was correctly denied.

He further erred in reversing the hearing

officer and finding a disqualifying transfer of assets. The
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Director's decision should be reversed and Medicaid benefits
granted from the date of the first application.
Respectfully submitted this,^/C-~ day of //7^/^A^

, 1990.

[CHAEL E. BULSON
Attorney for Petitioner

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this &< /~^~ day of /''/tt/i&vi

.

1990, I served copies of the above BRIEF OF PETITIONER by Firstclass mail, postage prepaid, upon:
R. Paul Van Dam
Attorney General of Utah
State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

J. Stephen Mikita
Assistant Attorney General
120 N. 200 W.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84401

*L-

[CHAEL E. BULSON
Attorney at Law
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VOLUME IIIM
TRANSFER OF ASSETS - Transfers On or After July 1, 1988

565-? * Ji'MLf_eiis„Oii._or_After..Jul^/ JJ_l_98_8
1.

When to Sanction C1.Lenjs
Sanction clients who transfer assets for less than fair market
value to become eligible for Medicaid. It does not matter if
the client is a resident of a medical institution or approved
for the Home and Lommunity-Based Care Haiver at the time of the
transfer.

2.

Hhen NOT to Sanction _CLtents
Do not sanction clients in these situations:
A6

Do not sanction the client if the asset was transferred
more than 30 months prior to the date of the application.

B.

Do not sanction the client if the client can prove the
asset was not transferred in otder to become eligible for
Medicaid. It is the client's responsibility to provide
evidence that a transfer was made for another purpose AND
that Medicaid was not even a minor factor in the decision.
Follow the guidelines in Sec. 565-3.

C.

Do not sanction the client if the sanction would be an
undue hardship. Follow the rules in Sec. 565-4.

D.

Do not sanction the client if the transfer fits one of the
following situations. (The "5 OK Transfers")
(1)

Transfer .of a home to the spouse.

(2)

Transfer of any asset to a spouse OR a blind or
disabled son or daughter.

(3)

Transfer of a home to a son or daughter under 21 years
of age.

(4)

Transfer of a home to a sibling who has an equity
interest in the home and who has lived in the home for
at least 1 year Immediately preceding the client's
entry into a medical institution.

(5)

Transfer of a home to a son or a daughter who has
lived In the home and cared for the client for at
least 2 years prior to the individual's entry into the
medical institution.

VOLUME IIIM
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3.

Secondary Transfers After October 1. 1989
If assets have been transferred without sanction because the
situation Is one Identified 1n Sec. 565-2 #2(D), sanction the client
1f the asset 1s transferred again AFTER October 1, 1989 for less than
fair market value.
Sanction the Individual making the first transfer. The sanction
period for the Individual must be based on the value of the asset
that person transferred. If the person making the secondary transfer
also transfers some of his own assets 1n addition to the assets
received from the first transfer, that person may also be sanctioned.
The sanction period for either Individual begins on the date of the
secondary transfer.
THERE IS ONE EXCEPTION TO THIS RULE: Do not sanction anyone if the
secondary transfer also fits one of the situations In Sec. 565-2.

EXAMPLE:
Mary and Boh Jones were both identified on the deed as own^s of their home, which
is worth $36,000. Before entering a nursing home in June, Mary transfeired her J/2
interest in the home to her husband. Mary was not sanction for this transfer because
Sec. 565-2 #2(D) says that a client may transfer any asset to a spouse without being
sanctioned.
In October, Bob Jones signed a quit claim deed giving the house to his son for $L00.
His son is over 21, not disabled, and had not been living in the house prior to the
transfer. Bob is sanctioned for the transfer of his half of the house. Marv is sanctioned
for the half of the house she gave to Bob and he transferred. The sanctions begin in
August for both of them.
4.

How to Sanction the Client
Clients who are sanctioned for transferring assets are not eligible
for institutional care or Home and Community-Based Care. They may be
eligible for regular Medicaid services. Apply the Medicaid policy in
Volume H I D .
Report the client's name and PACMIS ID number to either PDU or Health
Care Financing. You may do this on the phone, In writing, or by
PACMIS Mailbox addressed to Jennifer P. Lee.

565-2

Page 2
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5•

Setting the Sanction Period
A.

The period of ineligibility begins with the month in which the
assets were last transferred. The client is ineligible for the
LESSER of:
(1)

30 months, OR

(2)

the number of months resulting from dividing the
uncompensated value by the average private-pay rate for
nursing homes. The uncompensated value is the difference
between the equity value of the transferred asset and the
amount of money received by the client for it. (Equity
value is the fair market value minus any indebtedness
against the asset.) See Table II for the average
private-pay rate for nursing homes.

565-2

Page 3
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565-3

Transfer to Become Eligible
Do not sanction the client if the client can prove that Medicaid was
not a reason for the transfer. The client must also prove that he
did not expect Medicaid to meet his needs after transferring the
asset.

l.

Verification
It is the client's responsibility to provide all supporting
documentation, such as legal documents, realtor agreements,
relevant correspondence, and statements from other individuals.
If the client needs help getting these, a worker may help.
If the client claims that Medicaid was not a factor
in the
decision to transfer the asset, ask the client to write a
statement explaining:
Ae

The reason for the transfer

B.

Attempts to transfer the asset for fair market value

C.

The reason for accepting less than fair market value

D.

The client's plans for providing for himself after the
transfer

E.

The client's relationship to the new owner of the asset

F.

Hhy the client believes he received fair market value for
the asset

VOLUME IIIM
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2.

Some Factors Indicating the Transfer Was Not to Become Eligible
Here 1s a list of some factors which may Indicate the client did
not transfer assets to become eligible and did not expect
Medicaid to meet his needs after the transfer. This list 1s not
all-inclusive.
A.

ThS client suddenly, unexpectedly, became disabled AFTER
the transfer.

B.

The client learned that he had a disabling condition AFTER
the transfer.

C.

The client unexpectedly lost other assets, worth more than
the Medicaid asset limit, AFTER the transfer.

D.

The transfer was court-ordered.

E.

The assets were transferred to a religious order by a
member of that order In accordance with a vow of poverty.

EXAMPLES;
Mr. Johnson applied for Medicaid in May. The previous June, he had sold assets
worth $8,000 for $0,000. He explained that he sold the assets to pay $4,000 in medical
bills. He accepted less than fair market value because he needed the money quickly
and could not wait for a better offer. When he transferred the money, his countable
assets were too high for Medicaid because he also owned farmland in Nevada wotth
$12,000. In January, he and his wife separated. She was given the farmland in the
divorce decree. Now his assets are below the asset limit. Mr. Johnson's claim that he
did not transfer the assets to become eligible should be accepted because he tried to
sell the asset for fair market value AND he would have remained ineligible for
Medicaid if he had not unexpectedly lost the farmland.
In February, Mrs. Mason transferred assets worth $53,000 to her daughter in exchange
for a life estate in the daughter's home. The life estate is worth $40,000. She did it
because she was elderly and no longer able to live alone. She did not want to move
into her daughter's home without paying her for it in some way. DO NOT accept Mrs.
Mason's claim that the transfer was not done to become eligible. Mrs. Mason knew
that she was getting older and would probably need medical care in the future. The
home could have been sold for fair market value and the difference betn>een its value
and the life estate value could have been used for her medical needs. Instead of
reserving her assets to provide for her medical care, she impoverished herself This is
evidence of an expectation that Medicaid would take care of her tnedical needs.
565-3 Page 2
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Eligibility Decisions
1.

Deadline for Determining Eligibility

j

A.

An eligibility decision must be made within 45 days of the
date of the application. There Is one exception: a
decision must be made within 90 days of the date of the
application If a disability determination mus-t be made as
part of the eligibility determination.
If a decision cannot be made before the deadline, document
the cause of the delay In the case record.

I
B.

If unverified eligibility factors do not affect the
eligibility of the entire household (For example, the
client has not given proof of citizenship for one child.),
the application may be approved for those members
determined elIgible.
The application cannot be approved if unverified
eligibility factors affect the whole household. (For
example, the wages of a working parent are unverified.)

2.

Certification of Decision
Indicate the eligibility decision on the last page of Form 61A
or Form 61FC. Record the eligibility decision on Form 727 Case
-Action Log.

3.

A.

If the application Is denied, note the date and the reason
for the denial.

B.

If the application Is approved, indicate the date and
category of assistance.

Notification of Approval or Denial
If the application is approved or denied, notify the applicant
In writing of the approval or denial, the reason for the action,
the policy citation 1n this manual, and the Social Services
office to contact for information on the income method used to
determine the spenddown.

4.

ALERTS and PENDS
Put an ALERT on a case when a change 1s expected to occur before
the next review 1f that change will not affect eligibility.
Put a PEND on a case if a change is expected to occur before the
next review if that change will affect eligibility. Also use
PENDS to ensure that Information or proofs are collected from
the client.
703-5
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731

Verification

731-1

What Must Be Verified?
All factors of eligibility must be verified.
There is .only one exception to this rule. It.is called "The Prudent
Person Concept". This assumes that, as a prudent, person, you can use
your professional judgement to decide if somethitig can be left
unverified. If you decide to accept the client's- word for something
instead of verifying it, document it in the case record or
application form.

731-2

Who Must Provide Verification?
It is the responsibility of the applicant or recipient to obtain
acceptable verification of eligibility factors. Help the client to
get the verification if the client needs help.

731-3

What is Acceptable Verification?
Verification may be those items listed on the Verification Tables or
other documents accepted by the district worker.
File copies of acceptable documents in the case record. When a
narrative record is used to record verification of items for which
there is no document, attach a sheet of paper in the case record. On
the sheet of paper, explain how that item was verified. Sien and
date the paper.

731-4

Primary Verification
The verification tables list examples of acceptable verification for
each eligibility factor for the appropriate category and program.
Once an eligibility factor has been verified, no further verification
is necessary unless it is an item subject to change and would be
reverified at a regular time.

731
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assistance throughn>the local Office' of Community
Procedures for Medicaid/UMAP .* ' r
Operations (OCO), Assistance Payments'1 Administration (APA), Department1 o f Social Services ^ (DSS),
'Applicants, Recipients and Providers
must submit a written request for an eligibility deteR455-14-0. Policy Statement
'
}j
on
rmination hearing' to: The Department, of- Social
R455-14-1. Administrative Hearing Procedures Provide . \
Serviced Office of Administrative * Hearings,'^P. 0.
R455-14-2. Discovery
, .,
^ , M
»
/ '
Box 45500, Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0500 V"the
R455-14-3. Declaratory Orders ;
. v '
*
applicant may deliver the written request in person to
f i
,4
jt\
' i
'
<\ -»« 4
i M
* r
H
' i
->
<-«
*,
it
thelocalOCO. '•
' ' I, ' »-j>'t * ;:•»•!*, ,<^
R455-14-0. Policy Statement >> .
3. Eligibility Hearing for 'both f^on-Medicai
It is the policy of the Division of Health Care Assistance AND Medical Assistance •* «*' *» i^»> f ! D \
r
Financing to resolve disputes at the lowest level. The
If eligibility for a non-medical * assistance
following rules are not meant to foreclose the Diviprogram(s) in addition to Medicaid/UMAP' is "at
sion's preference, for informal resolutions through
issue, the Medicaid/UMAP eligibility determination
open discussion and negotiation between the Divihearing shall be conducted by the Department' of
sion, and applicants, recipients and providers. .. | ( Jj |
Social. Services through the Office of Administrative
R455-14-1. Administrative Hearing Procedures ' '-['
Hearings. Requests for such hearings shall be' sent ^to
r
* : Provide '
"• • '
**>U " r> v<
the address in Section 2, above. * All such hearings
if Ai HEARING PROVISIONS ,'"i"l fl. .f - PM
shall be conducted according to DSS hearing rules.
•r 1. Hearing Responsibility J"
>*
>i ? *n» * I | DSS shall propose a recommended decision concer) a In accordance with Section 1902(a)(3) of the ning the medical assistance issue(s) 'only and shall
Social Security Act, 42 Code of Federal Regulations submit it to the Executive Director qf DOH or his/
:(CFR) Part* 431, Subpart E, Sections 26-1-4.1 and
her designated representative for agent/ review.
26-23-2 U. C. > A: (1953), and 63-46b-l, et seq.' Thereafter the recommended'* decision ^hallvbe
U. .C. AJ (1987)/ ail' Title XIX <Medicaid)/Utah
handled in accordance with 'Sections^ 63-46b-12
'Medical Assistance Program (UMAP) recipients or and63-46D-15,U.C.A.(1987). '.«»^»;a i Wlty'«fl»|
providers (and applicants under certain circumsta4. Eligibility Hearing For Medical Assistance Onlyf '
nces) aggrieved by any action: or inaction of the
\ AH requests for hearings to consider eligibilityf as
-Department!of Health (DOH), Division of Health to medical assistance only, shall be forwardedr by
Care Financing (DHCF), will be given anopporUH DSS to DHCF, A formal hearing in'accordance with
nity for a hearing upon written request. M i ' 1« • , 0 i the hearing procedures herein shall be. conducted I by
r
! > M*
b, A hearing < is not required and will not * be DHCF.
^ i v i . r i ,-M '• iU
%i
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* 5.Definitions ^ ? > '
'>"•>«
' (6) A statement that the aggrieved person may
* The definitions of the5 Utah Administrative Proc* represent himself or use legal counsel, relative, friend
r
i
edure Acf (UAPA), Section 63-46b-l, et seq., U. or other spokesman at the formal hearing; and, '
C. J A.* (1987) as set forth in Section 63-46b-2 are
(7) An explanation of the circumstances "under
hereby incorporated by reference. In addition: '
which' Medicaid/UMAP coverage or reimbursement
a. "Action" means a' denial of Medicaid/UMAP will be continued if a formal hearing is timely requ'
*
*
eligibility as 1 regards an' applicant; denial, termina- ested.
c. Advance Notice ilt '• • « ' '' " • (i ! "
tion, suspension, or reduction of Medicaid/UMAP
DHCF will mail a notice at least ten (10) calendar
covered services in the case of recipients;' or, a reduction or denial of reimbursement for such services, days before the date of the intended action EXCEPT
findings of licensing survey deficiencies requiring a as noted below:
(1) DHCF may mail a notice not later than the
Plan of Correction, failure of DHCF to accept a
Plan j of Correction'required by licensing, or other date of action if:
sanctions as'set forth' in "DHCF ADMINISTRA(a) DHCF has factual information confirming the
TIVE SANCTIONS4 PROCEDURES AND GUIDE- death of a recipient/provider;
LINES", R455-22, in the case of providers.
(b) DHCF receives a clear written statement signed
-''
b. "Aggrieved Person" means any applicant, reci- by a recipient/provider that:
1
pient or provider aggrieved by any action or inaction
1) He/she no longer wishes services or reimburs(
of DHCF. '•/ *' ' v
ement, or
c. "Date of ^Action*' means the date on which a
2) Gives information that requires termination or <
denial of eligibdity for, termination, suspension or reduction of services or reimbursement and indicates
reduction' of Medicaid/UMAP covered services that he/she understands that this must be the result
becomes effective, in the case of applicants or reci- of supplying that information;
pients; or, in the case of providers the date on which:
(c) The recipient has been admitted to an institu* (1) A reduction or* denial or reimbursement or tion where he/she is ineligible under the State Plan
for further services;
sanction becomes effective;
• *•
; (2) Notice is given of licensing1 survey'deficiencies;
(d) The recipient/provider's whereabouts are
unknown and the Post Office returns DHCF mail
or i
* ' *• V
»
' (3)J,Notice3isi'giverr,rthat',DHCF will not accept a directed to him/her indicating no forwarding
plan of correction of survey deficiencies required by address; *
(e) DHCF establishes the fact that the recipient has
licensing. , , „ , , ' . ,
».
d. "Division Director"' means the Director of the been accepted for Medicaid/UMAP services by
Division of - Health Care Financing of the Utah another local jurisdiction, State, Territory or ComDepartment of Health or his/her designated and monwealth; "
(0 A change in the level of medical care is prescrauthorized representative.
' •
* e. "Executive Director* means the Executive Dir- ibed by the recipient's physician; or
(g) A termination, suspension or reduction of
'ector'of the Utah Department of Health or his/her
designated and authorized representative.
, Medicaid/UMAP covered services or reimbursement
f, }*Formal Hearing* means a hearing before a is necessitated- by an imminent peril to the public
hearing officer, conducted in' accordance with health, safety, or welfare.
(2) DHCF may shorten the period of advance
UAPA.
*;4
" g, "Notice** means a 'written statement o f ' the mailed notice to five (5) days before the date of
action" DHCF intends to take, the reasons for the action if:
(a) DHCF has facts indicating that action' should
intended action, the specific regulations that support
(or the change in Federal or State law that requires) be taken because of probable fraud by the applicant/
the' action, the right to a hearing when applicable, recipient/provider; and
(b) The facts have been verified, by affidavit, if
the procedure to obtain a hearing, and an explanation of the circumstances under which Medicaid/ possible.
7. Request for Formal Hearing and Agency RespUMAP benefits or reimbursement will be continued
onse
if a hearing is requested.
Formal hearings are held for "medical assistance
hM "Request for a Formal Hearing"* means a clear
expression in writing which meets the criteria of a only" issues. If an aggrieved person's request for an
"Request for Agency Action* as set forth by Section eligibility hearing concerns both non-medical assis63-46b-3(2)(c), U. >C. A, (1987) by an aggrieved tance and medical assistance, he should refer to R45514-1.A.3, above.
person or authorized representative, , ,
An aggrieved person may request a formal hearing
6.Notice
„' j1
„, / . *
(,
(4
f
within the following -deadlines, depending upon the
a. When Notice Required
Every individual who is affected by an adverse type of request:
a. An aggrieved UMAP or Medicaid provider may
action taken by DHCF will be given timely notice. ,
request a formal hearing within 30 calendar days
b. Content of Notice
, >t
r
from the date written notice is issued or mailed,
A notice under this Section must contain:
', ,
whichever is later, by DHCF of an action or inac( ,(1) A statement of the action DHCF intends to
l
tion.
;
take;
V t hj / „ k * H|
b.
An
aggrieved Medicaid applicant or recipient
(2) The date the intended action takes effect; u
may request a formal hearing regarding eligibility for
0) The reasons for the intended action;
K !
(4) The specific regulations that support, or the "medical assistance only" within 90 calendar days
change in Federal or State law^ or policy, that requ- from the date written notice is issued or mailed,
whichever is later, by DHCF of an action or intended
ires the action;, lt ' . , , ' .
*
<
,
i
I t (5) ¥The aggrieved person's right to request a action. , »
c. An aggrieved UMAP applicant or recipient may
formal hearing before DHCF, when applicable, and
the method by which such hearing may be obtained request a formal hearing regarding eligibility within
90 calendar days from the date written notice is
from DHCF;
f/mtt m Ct\
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(2) The aggrieved person prolongs ^jthti Rearing
-issued or mailed, whichever is later, by DHCF of an
i^actipn or intended action. <
v ,\ *
, , process without good cause; or, ' « , !j r*•.»?'" iH 1 «/rf { 1
- (3) A recipient's whereabouts, -are • unknown,1 >, as
d. An aggrieved UMAP applicant or.recipient may
..request a formal heanng regarding scope of service indicated by the return of agency mail. directed ^to
within 30 calendar days from, the date written notice him/her which is not forwardable,u< t^.jVJl ^ u^t ^w^
' . *ttC * $ lrii\ * f -} r
is .issued or mailed, whichever is later,, by,DHCF of ^ 10. Formal Hearing
(
*,i * a. How to Request a Formal Hearing </ * v* (, h * > '
an action or iritended actions \
.
A request for a formal hearing must, be made to
e. Failure to submit a timely request for a formal
, hearing will constitute a waiver f of a person's formal the Division of Health . Care Financing, 2881 North
I hearing / or pre-heanng rights. A request for a 1460 West, P. O. Box 16580,' Salt Lake City, Utah
'hearing shall be in writing, shall be dated,.and shall; 84116-0580, Attention: "Formal Hearings.*
v v^ & Tl-j
b. Notice of Formal Hearing > i" , v<, , J • y 1 [' ; ^
.explain the reasons for which the hearing is reque-j
sted. An aggrieved person may use the hearing,
DHCF shall notify the aggrieved. person and/or
.request form which, is attached to all negative eligi- his/her attorney, in writing, of the date, time and
bility action notices, or the form which is provided in place, of the hearing. Notice, shall *be mailed not less
than ten (10) calendar days, before the scheduled, date
t Attachment "A,*- which is entitled "Requests for
Hearing/Agency Action/ DHCF will provide ^copies of the formal hearing. (s ,, *< ~ j *.} f >/ Vs-' 'if
of. the, form in'Attachment A to all interested, , c* Form of Papers
t
•' '>, ^ s "* - *t rjj
1
persons. The address for submitting a "Request forj
All papers to be filed in a formal hearing shall j ^ ,Hearing/Agency * Action" for: (a) Medicaid or
(1) Be typewritten or legibly hand-written;^ ,<f s
^UMAP providers; and (b) Medicaid or UMAP scope ' (2) Bear a caption clearly showing,the title;of the
, of service hearings is as follows:
, < r ^ ^' * hearing;
, i . \ »" [ p ift l , <\ ^ ^ ^ , $ 1
Division of Health Care Financing tii^ilt
'
,
(3)
Bear
the
docket
number,
if any; ,«» ' ? *; ^ rr «
)
Attention: Formal Hearings » .
* (! r{,
(4) Be dated and signed by the party or his/her
„ ( . P.O. Box 16580 . « •
» '{ , ; . , authorized representative and shall 0 contain - his/her
' ' Salt Lake City, Utah 84116-0580
, ' •,
address and telephone number; and >[ i \ :i i\ . \\\y
The
address
for
submitting
a
"Request
for
Hearing/
(5) Consist of an, original and two (2) copies< filed
u
r Agency,,Action for Medicaid and UMAP applicants with DHCF.
'" »'< *< "•• •» >* '.^ ' ,
, regarding eligibility issues is:
,
Heanngs may be delayed iuntil* these requirements
} j | ( * r,
The Department of Social Services
d. Service
•
- \ >, * * ^ ^ ^ > >'
~ Office of Administrative Hearings , , ». , : ', . i
' ^ P . O . B O X 45500
,.
.
•;. ' • ,, , J
j , (1) The party filing papers and documents shall
\ Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0500
"
\ < serve them upon all parties to the formal'^hearing.
/
f. Requests for formal hearing wilt be docketed Proof of service shall be filed with DHCf. * *f' r
(2) Service shall be personally delivered or by mail,
and scheduled within 30 calendar days. DHCF as
respondent shall schedule a hearing or begin negoti-' properly addressed with postage prepaid/,one (1)
i, ations in the matter in writing within 30 days of the copy to each party entitled thereto. When a( party is
date of i5suance) of1 the request for formal hearing or represented by an attorney, service upon the attorney
K
.
, shall be deemed service upon the party or parties^. ' '
r agency action. ,
r
(3) Proof of service shall be^y certificate, affidavit
*\ 8. Denial or Dismissal of Request for a Hearing . I
'' '' •'^ ^ ^ ,4 .*
, DOH or DHCF may deny or dismiss a(.request fori or acknowledgment.
(4) Wherever notice by DHCF is required,' notifi.' a formal hearing if: * ',
II
a. The aggrieved person withdraws the request in cation shall be effective upon the date of first.class
mailing to a party's residence or business address, ')„*
^writing; r
, , „,
, , ,</
(5) In addition to the methods set forth,in, these
b. The aggrieved person fails to appear ata.sche-,
duled hearing without good cause; or
i rules, a party may be served in any manner permitted
i
„ c. The provider fails to allow DHCF access to its bylaw.
'
" t \ ' ' , . * - V ' V *., J J,
'records pursuant to R455-14-2 below.
'' ,
J '^intervention "'*"* ^rifu J
^l^K'*
9. Reinstatement/Continuation of Services
} p As permitted by' Utah Code 'Annlk 63-46b-10,
^ a. DHCF may reinstate services for recipients or, intervention will be permitted provided the following
suspend any adverse action for providers as defined requirements are met: , * '''; , t '° '^' T V '
*in Section 5.a if an aggrieved person requests an!
(1) Persons desiring to intervene' In a formal
* formal hearing not more than ten (10) calendar days, heanng must petition for leave to intervene'at least
!
after the date of action/
' '"
' \ seven (7) days before the scheduled hearing,;unless
' b. DHCF must' reinstate or continue services for, otherwise permitted by the hearing officer. * " * \
recipients or suspend adverse actions for providers
(2) The petition must contain a clear and concise
r?
until a decision is rendered after a formal hearing if:
) statement of the direct and substantial interest of the
J
(I) Adverse action is taken without giving the ten person seeking leave to intervene in the hearing. * l\
(10) day advanced mailed notice to a recipient/
(3) Persons seeking affirmative relief, shall state the
{provider in all circumstances where such' advance basis of such relief. ' << fi,l< ( » ' f,il%l%;'"
\
i
'notice is required; ' I '
*'
' *•'''' j
(4) Other parties to the hearing' hiust', have an
;<
• ' (2) In those circumstances where advance notice is opportunity to support or oppose intervention. '}' f*
" not required, as set forth in section 6.c.(l); the agg-' ' (5) The hearing'officer may grant leave'to interrieved person requests a formal hearing within ten^ vene subject to such reasonable conditions as he may
J
'(10) calendar' days following the date the adverse prescribe. An intervener may be 'dismissed from the
'action notice is mailed; '
*'
-'• l' "M . <* ' | hearing if it appears that he has no direct or substa* (3)' DHCF determines that the action resulted from1 ntial interest in the hearing. u\l V ji: - ^ " l , ' U i"*'
1
other'than the'application of Federal or State law or - f Conduct of Heanng r J? •' 'H I'1?! P / l: 'J] *, <
^policy, "» ''"'• ' ' / ' ! ; '' l * ' ^ ' ' w u " 1
(1) Formal hearings shall be conducted by an
1
c. DHCF may proceed with its intended action if:* '' r j impartial hearing officer who is appointed by DOH,
*'"(!) The aggrieved person withdraws his request for! The hearing officer shall be empowered with 'such
f either a formal hearing in writing; or, ,'«'v»» « ' M ' \ authority as granted by Section 63-46b-li; et seq.
*
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- U. C*** A * (1987), except as may be limited by these
, ruIes*l,No hearing fofficer' shall have, been directly
r involved tin, the.iinitial determination of. the action in
( question.'i-'vu^ i^ ,*\ ii/tl m* u<,ji », fw .tiwm
],(2);AIl formal hearings shall be ^conducted only
after adequate written notice of the hearing has been
served.on all parties setting forth the time,.date and
r
place of the hearing, , '
,J,IU.I \ HJ
» v (3) Testimony shall be taken.'under oath) or affirmation administered by the hearing officers< „i ;.. • «
i in (4) Each party shall have the right to:, *,u :. ii 4 \ ~
m (a) call and examine parties and witnesses; \ , .u t .-.
.&,(b) introduce exhibits; j p i , ..„*„. . «.w M 1 t % i>
„</ (c) question opposing, witnesses and parties on any
matter relevant to the issue even though the matter
> ,was not covered in the direct examination; ,.,
*
(d) impeach any witness regardless of which party
first called him/her to testify; and
lS. v,,,. ^
l,, (c) rebut the evidence against him/her. ut 1 41 \*»
& (5) The rules of evidence as applied in civil actions
in the courts of this Stale shall be generally followed
{ in the* hearings.' Any relevant evidence may be admitted if it is the type of evidence commonly relied
', upon by. prudent men in the conduct of their affairs.
^ Hearsaytevidence;mayi be used for1 the purpose of
!
supplementing or explaining other evidence, but shall
not be sufficient*by,itself to support a* finding unless
* it would be admissible over objection in civil actions.
- The.hearing officer shall give effect to the rules of
• privilege recognized». by law..,* Irrelevant, immaterial
;•• and unduly repetitious evidence shall be excluded.
,
(* v (6). »Thc» hearing* officer may order .the taking of
interrogatories and depositions and assess the expense
• to the requesting, party if the hearing officer deems it
, proper. . , ' » • > « / '
j , * _. n .,.«.*,. » 1
» ,U (7) The*hearing officer; may question any party) or
„ witness 1 and may admit, any evidence he believes is
, relevant or material. >
M w u i v i* ^ .« » .<-.•
-<f (8) .The hearing officer shall control the taking of
evidence in. a manner best. determined to be best
1
suited to ascertain the facts and safeguard the rights
of the parties. The, hearing officer shall explain the
< issues and the order in which evidence will be received., D <nr, «.>M*js>{un.»-in. *r.r<-> MI • JI.
,.'t. (9)-A J party has the burden of proving, by a prep, . onderance_ ofu the., evidence whatever, facts it » must
establish to, sustain its position. A provider always
•; has the burden of proof to show that services were,
! in fact, rendered as billed, -mi > _m L I M < • )..<.
- *, (10) Jhe burden of proof as'to a particular 1 fact is
on the party against whom a finding on that fact
1
would be required in the absence of further evidence.
. g. Ex Parte Communications t „> < * * • , , , ,
< r ( l ) . Except as otherwise provided below/ ex parte
\ communications are prohibited. t
',
v ,
(2) The hearing officer shall1 decline to listen to or
l
accept any communication offered in violation of
f this rule and shall explain to the oTferor that any
communication received off the record and in violation of this rule must be made a part of the record
and furnished to all parties.
.
;
»' (3) This rule shall ^OT apply to; , / " j 1
,
i *., (a)-The disposition of ex parte1 matters authorized

R455-14-1

additional evidence is necessary for the proper determination of the case,» he/she may at his/her discretion: V CX t
v J.l twV *.» Mu . Wf,|/-;((U i
i (a) Continue'the hearing to a later date and order '
the party to produce additional evidence; or . . ^ ui
,, (b) Close the hearing and hold the record open in
order to permit the introduction, of additional documentary evidence. Any evidence so submitted shall be
made available* to both parties and each party. shall
have the opportunity for rebuttal. ; \, >
t
,»!„»>'
(3) Written notice of the time and place of a continued or further hearing shall be given in accordance
with Section lO.b, except that when a continuance is
ordered during a hearing and adequate oral notice is

i. Record
A complete* record of all formal' hearings shall oe
made. The testimony shall be electronically recorded
and/or memorialized by court reporter. The recording and/or memorialization shall be transcribed if
requested by a party to the hearing. The requesting
party shall pay the costs of transcription and for
copying costs. At the conclusion of the formal
hearing, the complete record of the hearing will be
maintained in a secured area and shall be considered
the sole property of DHCF. DHCF or its designated
agent will retain electronic r e c o r d i n g s /
memorialization of formal hearings Tor a perjod of
one (1) year. Written records and documents will be
retained for a period not to exceed three (3) years. „ 1 t tr,
j. Proposed Decision and Final Agency Review *' " v
(1) At the conclusion of the formal hearing, the
hearing officer shall take the, matter, under advisement and shall submit to the Executive Director of
DOH a proposed decision, based on the evidence and
testimony introduced at the hearing.
,'
{>t {
(2) The proposed decision shall be tn writing and
shall contain findings of fact and conclusions of law.
(3) The Executive Director of DOH may:
( ,. , , \
(a) adopt the proposed decision, or any portion of
the decision. {
,
,*'**'!'
(b) reject' the proposed decision, or any portion
thereof, and make his own independent determination based upon the record.
(
i t j
(c) remand the matter to the hearing officer to take
additional evidence; and the hearing officer thereafter shall submit to the Executive Director of POH a
new proposed decision.
)4,
(4) Review by the Executive Director constitutes
agency review and final administration action, and is
subject to judicial review in accordance with the
procedures set forth in Subsection 10.1.
,s r
(5) The aggrieved person or his/her representative
shall be notified of the final' administrative action
and the aggrieved person's right to judicial review of
the action.
'
t ,'
(6) When the final administrative action is favorable to the aggrieved person, DHCF shall promptly
take corrective action.
, ,
«
(7) Subject to provisions for safeguarding confidential information, all hearing decisions shall be kept
on file for public inspection.
'
,
k. Agency Review '
"" *' °
-L (^ ] .
l
!
Reconsideration. Section 63-46b-13 Utah ' Code
^ byiaw^or"-;;; : / " h l *\," , ;'
\* \ (b). Communications concerning "status of the Ann. 1953, as amended, is hereby incorporated by
reference.
,
hearing and uncontested procedural matters. \
?,li*,,/r ) f T " !
\ \ t h. Continuances or Further Hearings ' ," " ', "~r *' ( j I. Judicial Review' »' '(1) Judicial review of a final agency action may be
\ ^'(1^'The hearing* Officer may continue a formal
»*' hearing to another'time or place, or order a further secured by the aggrieved party by filing a petition in
' "• hearing on his/her own motion or upon the showing the Utah Court of Appeals within thirty (30) days
after issuance of the Executive Directors final
of good cause, at the request of any party.
_, (
M *' (2) ' Where 1 the' hearing officer determines (hat administrative action. The petition shall be served
Ctn>ti«Co
PTOKO.
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upon the Executive Director and shall state the interrogatories and depositions, and • seti "appropriate
grounds upon which review is sought. The Executive time-frames, assess sanctions for"ndri-compliance,
Director shall file with his/her Answer certified and assess the expense to therequesting?p«utyvif>thc
documents, papers, transcripts of all testimony taken hearing officer deems it proper, ?e *fv if!' •* ^ : ' f'*&*& &%$in the matter, recommended findings of fact and *' b. The<hearing officer may permit the Tiling' of
conclusions of law of the hearing officer and the Requests .for -Admission,^ set' 'appropriate<timefinal administrative action of the Executive Director. > \* frames for responses, and assess sanctions'foi*1 non^
• •/,'• \\\. ^ j t n ^ ^ ^ t f y ^ ^ M j ,
•'{2) Judicial review of final administrative action is compliance. ' «
<it^'\\^V',t^iA
governed by Section ' 63-46b*-16 and Section 63- • \ 5. Medical Examination-** *" l^>(;j
46b-l, et seq. U. C. A. (1987), and Section 78-2a- -, a. The hearing officer may order'at'DHCF^ expense
3,U.C.A.(1953);
- r " >'•' " s> :.W:T ; : Miy-W * •„:••• ' a medical assessment in order to: obtain {information
necessary for a' fair decision. fThis information
R455-14-2. Discovery • * , ll ' '
;, f ";•;'•;'.!;' p*
subject to confidentiality requirements' shall be\ made
1
rJ
\. A. DISCOVERY PROVISIONS ,' \ '^;J'^ a part of the formal hearing record.'x i ;:»• iw. I?*«I»{'I u '•'•**
"' The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are inapplicable *.?. 6. Witnesses and Subpoenas '•''• w •«>.'.• '"^ ^if »v »r vj;im
to these proceedings and no formal discovery except
» a. A party shall arrange for the*presence*of jlis
as set forth hereinafter shall be permitted. Unless ; witnesses at thehearing. ir. ^»ra;.v
(whzjw^tL'h)
otherwise limited by order of the hearing officer, the
5
b.
A
subpoena
to
compel"the^
attendance-of
ia
scope of discovery -in formal adjudicative proceedjngs
4
witness
or
thV
production
of
evidence
i
may'
be
issued
shall be as follows: ,.
\t
;,
the hearing officer; upon written' request by a
V' l. Review of Applicant/Recipient and Provider by
party and a sufficient showing of need/ *t. m*f t ^ ii m
:
Records"" ; ' :,;;''; -. '
', ] 'M\{\;''.\i' "' ;
- c A subpoena may also be issued by the hearing
!'( a. DHCF shall be permitted to review all records officer
on his own motions ! - ' t M >!»• *' f* &• tow*
which are pertinent to the hearing which are in the
d. An application for subpoena duces tecum-for
custody or control of the applicant or recipient and
r
their health care providers. DHCF shall give at least the production by a witness of books, papers,' correspondence,
memoranda,
or
other
records shall be
three (3) days' written, notice the custodian of such
1
made
by
affidavit
to
the
hearing
?
officer.
\ The•* applidocument(s).
' .. ^
,,
f
cation
must
include:
^
'
•••'
•
'
*
•
'l*t^|f:'iifl"
d<J ZUlrM". Ab, DHCF shall be allowed to inspect a provider's
(1) The name and address' of the' person or^entity
records which are pertinent to the hearing. Inspection '.•
shall be made at the provider's business office during upon whom the subpoena is to be served; t./ ni tys- r, VJ
(2) A description of the documents, papers, books,
regular working hours! and After at least three (3)
7
accounts,
letters^ photographs,J; objects,••« or' tangible
days written notice.
,
' '.'
' j'.
! ••' ,
things
not
privileged,
that which the applicant seeks*"v*u;\;
^ 2 . Review of DHCF Records and FUes .j*!- t , , ^ "^
: (3) A showing of the materialityr ta> the 'issue invo.° a. Before the Formal Hearing r 'J . ' *' ' : "' , ']
in the hearing; and '
* :<K-A- .-rt*^
v
Upon prior written request, the aggrieved person lved
.
(4)
A
statement
by
the
applicant
that
to the best' of
,or his/her representative will be permitted to his knowledge the witness has* such items'ur
posexamine all documents and records to be used by the session or under his control. ? . • itiv ivtwM his
JW A M*
State at the formal hearing, not later than three (3) " e. The applicant shall arrange n o have all"subpojdays before the formal hearing.'The aggrieved party enas served which the hearing officer issues to him.
may request the Medicaid Management Information A copy- of the affidavit presented to»the* hearing
System (MMIS) claim file. This will be available, for officer
shall be served with the subpoena, ret"»? x^ii.i ;#
'review fifteen (15) calendar days after DHCF receives
f.
Except
for employees of DOH, witnesses subpa written request for the information. V
\ "\ ' ".'
oenaed for any hearing are entitled to appropriate
,t ,
; . b . At the Formal Hearing
!
The aggrieved person or his/her/, representative fees and mileage,; The witness^'shaJP file? a ''written
will be given an opportunity to:
' r 'j,; '
' /; demand for the fees with the hearing officer not later
than ten (10) days' after the date the witness appeared
1
(1) Examine the aggrieved person's' case file and at
the hearing. ''" << r • M Vmrr 'hv<t&T,fii <*hi ,\m>\
all documents, and records to be used by DHCF at
7. Sanction by Hearing Officer <n?H;•?. HlM(MJ ^*• nf
thehearing;
, '"
. ( , J , ^ ,,,.
i a / T h e hearing officer may"«sanction* orr> penalize
(2) Bring witnesses to the hearing; and
, J ^ any
party that fails'to obey an f order entered by the
(3) Establish all pertinent facts and circumstances.. '
hearing officer. ' .' *• fopi. n/fr ^ '4is-N»tt'W' x* t 'JI^^
^ 3 . Pre-hearing Procedure
. "/ '" \]''*'"'r ^ V''V
7
£"!
a.' The hearing of ficer may elect td hold ^ p r e - R45M4-3. Declaratory Orders^'™"f ^ ^ f
As required by Section 6 3 ^ 0 - 2 1 , 7 ^ . ' : ^.. A.
hearing meeting for any of the following reasons:'' ? ."'V ;
.' '(1) to formulate or simplify the issues; ' ''
; ; (1987), this rule provides for procedures 'for reques(2) to obtain admissions of, fact and documents ting of DOH through DHCF,' for the issuance^ of 9
which will avoid unnecessary proof;
,' , •
. declaratory order determining'* the , applicability" of.P ! a
rule, or order to specified circumstances^ ^ '. w;
'"(3) to arrange for the exchange of.proposed exhi- statute,
1
A. DEFINITIONS For purpose? of these1 prpvisbits or prepared expert testimony; n
, \ '\'? ~/r
(A) to! outline procedures to.be followed, at the
1. "Agency* means the Division of,"^ealth Care
formal hearing; or
(5) to agree to such other matters as may expedite Financing, Utah Department of,Healtl).' ^ J ];#;'^ )* *
h
2. "Applicability*' means a determjnaiion 'of
r the orderly, conduct pfv the hearing or tthe settlement
.thereof./";* '"•,/•! ""V^..,i' .'"'.'' .,
"/' *'?:'•'
whether a statute, rule, or order should ;tjc". applied,
•' 'Agreements reached during the conference shall be and if so, how the law as stated5 should, be applied to
recorded or the parties may enter into a written sti- specific facts and circumstances/, ^ ,^./ ^ i^-i,,.^' y
pulation or agree to a. statement made on thef record , 3. /Declaratory Ruling" means an^administrative
by the hearing officer,^
'
-, "n .'*' , .'.',!'
interpretation or explanation of rights^ status, ,and or
" 4. ' Interrogatories. Depositions, and Requests ' for other legal relations under a, specific statute^ ruleV or
Admissions
, f
,, ; .
order. -• *
,,..,.. ; u : ... p .. |f ,,TI h . , ^ . •: v > ,., r •
(
v. _,,
particular
L a.,,. The/ hearing officer, may order the |{ uking ( qf .• 4. "Order" means an *$ft$:y^on^fy,
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